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Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy 
of Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Setting the Record 
Straight on Dickerson v. United States 
Daniel M Katz) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Foliowing a decade without change, the past year witnessed significant 
alteration to the composition of the United States Supreme Court. In the 
span of several months, the High Court experienced substantial changes in 
its membership brought about in part by the death of its most prominent 
member, Chief Justice William Rehnquist. In periods of transition such as 
this, it is natural to speculate on the future course of this institution, but 
equally compelling are the reflections concernmg the historical 
significance of the recently completed era. In the most recent iteration, 
substantial attention centered upon the late Chief Justice, whose death 
focused interest not only on the institution which he guided for nearly two 
decades but also upon his personal jurisprudence. Comments regarding his 
legacy were wide-ranging and covered the gambit of cases that came 
before the High Court during his stewardship? 
I Daniel M. Katz, J.D., M.P.P. University of Michigan. Ph.D. Pre-Candidate, Department of 
Political Science and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. Prior versions 
of this article were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, 2006 Annual Meeting 
(Chicago, IL) and the New England Political Association, 2006 Annual Meeting (portsmouth, NH), 
where it was nominated for the Wood Conference Paper Prize. The author would like to thank all of 
these conference participants as well as Marvin Krislov, Arthur Lupia, Jenna Bednar, Khuram Siddiqui, 
Jennifer Miller-Gonzales, David Aaron, Mariah Zeisberg and Jim Klonoski for their contributions, 
comments, and assistance. Special thanks to Yale Kamisar for his substantial guidance in the crafting 
of this article. 
2 See. e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Rehnquist Scaled Back Rights of the Accused, TRIAL, Dec. 2005, at 
56 ("While Rehnquist failed in his effort to radically reconstruct criminal procedure law, he 
nevertheless enjoyed perhaps his greatest success in his 33 years on the Court by trimming back 
Warren Court initiatives in virtually every area of criminal procedure and habeas corpus."); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rehnquist's Steady Conservatism Reshaped the Law. TRIAL, Nov. 2005, at 70 ("William 
Rehnquist will be remembered as one of the most important Supreme Court justices in American 
history, partly for his length of service . . .. But more important, Rehnquist profoundly affected 
constitutional law by pushing it in a more conservative direction."); R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: 
William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARv. L. REv. 10, 16 (2005) ("His views did not always prevail, but his 
steady hand at the helm-his vision, leadership, and unwavering principles-made this in every respect 
the Rehnquist Court."); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist. 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 6, 6 (2005) ("[O]f all the bosses I have had as a lawyer, law teacher, and judge, Chief Justice 
William Hobbs Rehnquist was hands down the fairest and most efficient."); William N. La Forge, 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Remembered. 52 FED. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 26, 28 ("Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was known as a pragmatist in many respects, and, through artful compromise and fair-
minded debate intended to achieve the broadest majority possible, he strove to lead the Court with a 
303 
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One case, Dickerson v. United States/ garnered particular attention 
from commentators.4 In fact, even before his passing some argued this 
decision was critical to understanding the Rehnquist legacy.5 . In 
Dickerson, the Chief Justice authored a seven-member majority opinion 
which sustained Miranda v. Arizona.6 The decision was a surprise. 
Miranda had been a pillar of the Warren Court revolution, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist previously varied from meek support to outright 
dissention from the 1966 ruling.7 Thus, given his history, he seemed 
unlikely to author a supportive opinion in perhaps the key Miranda 
decision of the decade. 
In the wake of the Chief Justice's ruling, legal scholars grappled to 
interpret this apparently anomalous decision. This process produced a 
litany of explanations.8 Some commentators pursued a separation-of-
show of judicial unity, while also preserving the integrity and credibility of the Court and the law."); 
Tony Mauro, The Chief and Us: Chief Justice William Rehnquist. The News Media. and The Need For 
Dialog Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv. 407,407 (2006) ("He was a brilliant 
and modest jurist who loved the Supreme Court and loved history but did not, I am fairly sure, love the 
news media .... [H]e viewed [the media] as something of a distraction."). 
3 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, 
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Thomas, J.,joined.). 
4 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2; Cruz, supra note 2; Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the 
Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of Patience and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (2003); Yale Kamisar, 
Dickerson v. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics-and Then Its Supporters, 
in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006). 
5 Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, available at 
www.theatlantic.comldocI200504/rosen. With respect to Dickerson, Professor Rosen notes: 
Id. 
Rehnquist's evolution from Miranda's leading critic to its improbable savior 
infuriated conservatives and confused liberals; but in fact it was emblematic of 
his career . . .. [L ]iberals have never understood how significantly and 
frequently Rehnquist departed from doctrinaire conservative ideology, and 
conservatives have failed to grasp that his tactical flexibility was more effective 
than the rigid purity of Scalia and Thomas. In truth, Rehnquist carefully staked 
out a limbo between the right and the left and showed that it was a very good 
place to be . . .. As for judicial temperament, he was far more devoted to 
preserving tradition and majority rule than the generation of fire-breathing 
conservatives who followed him. 
6384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
7 See infra notes 102, 108 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 9, 10, 12. For a small sample of additional commentary, see also Paul G. Cassell, 
The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 898 (2001); 
Richard H. Fallon, Constitutional Law and the Supreme Court: Judicial Legitimacy and the Unwritten 
Constitution-A Comment on Miranda and Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 119 (2001); The 
Supreme Court 1999 Term: The Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 199-209 (2000); Conor G. 
Bateman, Note, Dickerson v. United States: Dickerson is Deemed a Constitutional Rule, But Does it 
Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 177 (2002); Andrew W. Muller, Note, Congress' Right to Remain 
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powers theory, positing that the Chief sought to protect the Court from 
encroachment by Congress.9 Some focused upon exogenous factors, 
arguing that public opinion motivated the Chief.lO Still others argued that 
the decision was strong evidence of Rehnquist's faithful adherence to the 
principle of stare decisis. I I The Dickerson opinion itself particularly 
supports this latter account. Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically noted, 
"[W]hether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its 
resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.,,12 
As written, many accounts accept the opinion at face value, thereby 
disavowing the potential of a strategic explanation. The difficulty with the 
non-strategic accounts is their failure to outline explicitly the evidence 
Silent in Dickerson v. United States -or- How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Miranda 
v. Arizona, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 801 (2001). 
9 See George M. Drey, The "Illegitimate Exercise oj Raw Judicial Power": The Supreme Court's 
TurJ Battle in Dickerson v. United States, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 47, 80-81, 88 (2001) ("[T]he Court 
defended Miranda because, in attacking this decision, Congress was intruding upon the court's turf ... 
. In short, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 struck a raw nerve; the Court felt the need to flex its judicial muscle in the 
face of what it perceived as a particularly well-targeted threat from a co-equal branch."); Arthur H. 
Garrison, Rehnquist v. Scalia-The Dickerson and Miranda Cases: A Debate on What Makes a 
Decision Constitutional, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 91, 133 (2001); Craig M. Bradley, Behind the 
Dickerson Decision, TRIAL, Oct. 2000, at 80. Professor Bradley advances two explanatory theories, the 
second of which argues that the separation of powers motivated the Chief. Specifically, he notes, 
"[T]his was likely because of the second reason Rehnquist's vote did not surprise me: his concern with 
maintaining the balance of power between the Court and Congress." Id. at 80. 
10 Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 253 n.17 (arguing that the majority in Dickerson was unwilling to 
endure the public criticism which would follow from overruling Miranda) (citing KENNETH W. STARR, 
FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 207 (2002)); Bradley, supra note 9, 
at 80 (describing how William Rehnquist admired former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes because 
"Hughes believed that unanimity of decision contributed to public confidence in the Court") (citing 
William Rehnquist, ChieJ Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1976)); Mitch Reid, 
Note, United States v. Dickerson: Uncovering Miranda's Once Hidden and Esoteric Constitutionality, 
38 Hous. L. REv. 1343, 1378-9 (2001) ("The simplest answer is that to hold otherwise the Court would 
have overturned a simple, yet comforting legal procedure embraced by most Americans . . . . 
Considering Miranda's popularity, imagine the enormity of public backlash the Court would have 
received if it overturned such a distinguished decision."). All of these arguments are bolstered by 
language contained within the opinion specifically noting that public opinion at least partially 
motivated the court. In particular, Justice Rehnquist wrote that public acceptance of Miranda has led it 
to become part of the "national culture." Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
" See Stephan os Bibas, The Rehnquist Court's Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=830724 
(December 12, 2006) ("Out of respect for stare decisis, the Court left in place Miranda's warnings but 
restricted its exclusionary rule and largely declined to extend Miranda."); Rosen, supra note 5 and 
accompanying text; Bradley, supra note 2, at 56-57. Contra William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist 
Court and the End oj Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences oj 
Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L.J. 53, 93-95; Kevin McNamee, Comment, Do As I Say and Not 
As I Do: Dickerson, Constitutional Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
LJ. 1239, 1293 (2001). 
12 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
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supporting the uniqueness of their theory. 13 Specifically, these 
explanations largely ignore the alternative set of preferences which could 
have produced the Chiefs decision. This is troubling because prior 
scholarship demonstrates that a chief justice possesses a unique set of 
institutional powers which provides significant incentive for him to behave 
sophisticatedly. 14 Many prevailing explanations for Dickerson at a 
minimum are incomplete because they fail to determine whether his vote 
and opinion were the result of moderation, fidelity to traditional legal 
principles, or, in fact, strategic behavior. 
This article pursues its own uniqueness claim, arguing the gravamen of 
available evidence supports a strategic explanation for Justice Rehnquist's 
behavior in Dickerson. To do this, the article first reviews the 
methodological debate which exists within the social science scholarship, a 
debate relevant to the competing explanations for the Dickerson decision. 
Next, the article explores the strategic or quasi-game-theoretic approach by 
describing the multistage sophisticated process which produces all 
Supreme Court decisions. It culminates in Figure 1.1, a general diagram 
that is carried forward into Part III of the article. 
Part III directly considers the Dickerson decision. This section begins 
with a description of the Supreme Court's Miranda jurisprudence before 
13 However, there are a few works that reflect an exception to this trend. See Cruz, supra note 2, at 
13-15; see also Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, 
Miranda, and the Continuing Questfor Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. I (2001); Yale 
Kamisar, From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . .. ,99 MICH. L. REv. 879 (2001); Kamisar, supra 
note 4; Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1032-33 (2001); 
Jeffery Standen, Symposium: Policy at the Intersection of Law and Politics-Panel One: The Politics 
of Miranda, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 555,564 (2003). 
14 Many books and articles either explicitly or implicitly advance this argument. See LEE EpSTEIN 
& JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY (1964); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST ApPROACHES 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the 
Chief Justice: The Nineteenth Century Legacy (Mar. 2006), University of Virginia Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper 42, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva---'publiclaw/art42. Unlike his predecessors, some have argued that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not use his administrative authority to obtain strategic advantage. This 
article argues against this view with respect to the discrete case of Dickerson v. United States. For a 
greater discussion of potentially strategic behavior of the late Rehnquist Court, see Linda Greenhouse, 
Forward: The Third Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 4, at xiii. Greenhouse, 
a prominent reporter for the New York Times, notes that in several major cases of the late Rehnquist 
Court, such as Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), the 
Chief voted with large majorities and crafted opinions which were "cryptic" and "not long on legal 
analysis." Id. at xviii. She argues that the Chief chose to engage a "sacrifice of cogency" to further 
greater institutional and societal interests. Yet, although Dickerson is "not long on legal analysis," 
Greenhouse's claim is inconsistent with the account provided herein as this article contends that 
institutional and societal interests did not animate Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in Dickerson. 
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reviewing the specific facts and procedural history of the case. Next, Part 
III reviews Justice Rehnquist's Miranda-related decisions which, taken 
together, demonstrate the truly anomalous nature of the Dickerson opinion. 
The article then outlines its strategic account, an approach rejecting many 
prevailing explanations of Rehnquist' s behavior. 
Strategic and non-strategic behaviors are often observationally 
equivalent. Thus, in order firmly to support its strategic theory, this article 
concludes with a discussion of several important post-Dickerson decisions, 
including Chavez v. Martinez/ 5 Missouri v. Seibert,16 and United States v. 
Patane,17 where the Chief Justice, to the surprise of some, supports the 
preservation of certain exceptions to Miranda even after his Dickerson 
opinion supposedly afforded Miranda full constitutional status. The cases 
are critical to the analysis because they help determine what end Chief 
Justice Rehnquist actually achieved in his Dickerson opinion. He 
successfully froze a set of pre-Dickerson Miranda exceptions that he 
personally developed during his thirty-year tenure on the Court. It is from 
this perspective that commentators in fact are correct to argue that 
Dickerson is.critical to understanding the legacy of the late Chief Justice. 18 
II. TOWARD A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING AND 
ACROSS THE GREAT METHODOLOGICAL DIVIDE 
Like many other subfields in the social sciences, the public law 
scholarship divides scholars into several methodological camps. Although 
theories of judicial decision-making have been the subject of numerous 
articles, edited volumes, and books, the methods employed to substantiate 
these theories are quite varied. Generally the scholarship finds individuals 
15 538 U.s. 760, 767 (2003) (explaining that until unwarned statements are introduced at trial, there 
is no constitutional violation). 
16 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Elstad standard should control 
to analyze whether taint of initial unwarned statement is vitiated by second warned statement). 
17 542 U.S. 630, 637 (2004) (noting that physical evidence located pursuant to unwarned 
statements is admissible unless statements actually coerced). 
18 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Professor Rosen, citing Dickerson, argues the Chief 
Justice is misunderstood by both liberal and conservative commentators. Specifically, he notes how 
Rehnquist, unlike his more conservative counterparts on the Court, often departed from "doctrinaire 
conservative ideology." While Rosen's thesis mayor may not be true, this article will show why 
Justice Rehnquist's behavior in Dickerson simply fails to substantiate his proposition that a 
reconsideration of Rehnquist jurisprudence is warranted. See Rosen, supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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subscribing to one of three major approaches: the legal model,19 the 
behavioralist attitudinal model,20 or some variant of the strategic model.21 
The legal model is the traditional means to consider judicial outcomes. 
Typically advanced by certain members of the legal academic community, 
it is a normative case-based approach, which argues that judicial outputs 
should be the byproduct of a deliberate application of legal principles that 
are neutral as to the identity of the parties?2 The model argues both that 
justices view themselves as significantly constrained by precedent and that 
political considerations are largely antithetical to the jurisprudential 
decision-making process. 
Proponents of Legal Realism,23 one of the historically important 
perspectives set forth by the legal academy, argue that in fact judicial 
decision-making is often animated by non-doctrinal considerations. 
Realists do not deny the relevance of the legal model for many cases, but 
can be distinguished from other scholars in the extent to which they believe 
extra-legal considerations animate judicial behavior.24 Therefore, for 
many, the approaches favored by social scientists and those favored by 
19 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
(\ 993). 
2°Id. 
21 See, e.g., EpSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14; SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note 14. 
22 For one description of the legal model, see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 19, at 33-64. The legal 
model as described by Segal & Spaeth is very much akin to fonnalist models of judicial decision-
making offered by the legal process scholars. For prominent work from the Legal Process School, see 
generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (\962); HENRY M. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William Eskridge, Jr., 
ed., 1994); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978); Herbert 
Weschler, Toward a Neutral Principal of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. I (\959). For other 
non-fonnalist strands of the legal model, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
23 Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 50, 50-66 (W. Edmunson et al. eds., 2003). Legal realists responded to the fonnalism 
which once attached to the explanation of judicial decision-making. Fonnalists posited "that judges 
decide cases on the basis of distinctively legal rules and reasons, which justify a unique result in most 
cases (perhaps every case)." Id. at 50. Realists countered arguing that the law was indetenninate and 
thus other non-doctrinal considerations actually animated judicial decision-making. There are several 
major sub-sets of realist scholars. However, those most common identified with realism include Karl 
Llewellyn, Max Radin, Jerome Frank, Hennan Oliphant, and Joseph Hutcheson. Some contend that 
legal realism is a discredited legal theory. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-54 (2d ed. 
1994). Others contend that realism persists as a cogent theory of the law. See Michael S. Green, Legal 
Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1917 (2005). 
24 Richard A. Brisben, Slaying the Dragon: Segal. Spaeth and the Function of the Law in Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 40 AM. 1. POL. SCI. 1004, 1007 (1996) ("[U]sing jurisprudential reasoning, 
much of the academic legal community has abandoned the political assumptions of Old Legal Process 
scholarship .... "). 
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legal academics have to some extent converged. Therefore, the question is 
no longer whether "law matters" but rather the extent to which it matters. 
It is a question of degree. Those who subscribe to most current 
conceptions of the legal model view the law as important but also 
recognize the political outlook of the actors as an additional driving force. 
As their name implies, behavioralists focus upon the objective behavior 
that typically manifests itself in the votes taken by judicial actors. In 
complete contrast to the legal model, Professors Segal and Spaeth, the 
primary proponents of the behavioral approach, posit judicial conduct can 
best be understood through their attitudinal model, an approach that argues 
justices cast votes to maximize their individual policy preferences?5 
Therefore, "Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is conservative 
while Marshall votes the way he does because he is extremely liberal.,,26 
Attitudinalists view justices as decision makers who always vote their 
unconstrained attitudes.27 Their outlook is methodologically attractive 
because it allows scholars to narrow their focus to the objective votes of 
the respective justices. Therefore, attitudinalists are able empirically to test 
their behavioral theories by studying publicly available voting records. 
Attitudinalists have made significant contributions to the public law 
scholarship. In particular, they have succeeded in convincing many that 
policy preferences do indeed matter. Despite its contribution to the debate, 
the attitudinal model suffers from significant criticism.28 While some of 
these demurrers lack an alternative hypothesis, the most sophisticated 
critique comes from those who seek to understand the strategic context 
25 In some sense, there is significant overlap between Segal and Spaeth, and Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) theorists in so much as both view policy preferences or ideology as the exclusive motivation of 
judicial actors. CLS theorists expand upon the work of legal realists, arguing that realist scholars vastly 
understate the degree of indeterminacy in the law. In other words, "[B]eneath the patina of legalistic 
jargon, law and judicial decision-making are neither separate nor separable from disputes about the 
kind of world we want to live in." Alan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 4 
(Alan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989). However, most directly, CLS emphasizes the connection between 
ideology and judicial outputs. CLS theorists believe that the logic of the law grows out of asymmetric 
power relationships. Thus, legal decision-making biases already favored groups. For a concise 
description of the argument of first order CLS scholars, see generally RICHARD W. BAUMAN, 
IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (2002). For a 
discussion of the distinctions between realism and CLS, see Debra Livingston, Round and Round the 
Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Studies, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (l982); Jeffery 
Standen, Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 VA. L. REV. (1986). 
26 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 19, at 65. 
27Id. 
28 For a small sample of critiques of the attitudinal model, see, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE 
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (l997); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial 
Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST ApPROACHES, supra note 14; FORREST MALTZMAN ET 
AL., CRAFTING LA W ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); Brisben, supra note 24. 
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through which justices maximize their individual policy preferences. 
Namely, as a follow-on to the wave of neo-institutional theories which 
have come to pervade the social sciences/9 many judicial scholars recently 
have sought to better understand how institutional rules and norms channel 
the decision-making process within the judicial branch.3o 
Specifically, although a justice may desire to vote in a liberal or 
conservative manner, there may be legal or institutional restraints which 
incentivize a contrary vote. Institutionalist scholars do not reject a neo-
classical maximization framework, but instead argue the notion of policy 
preference maximization cannot truly be understood without reference to 
the institutional context in which judicial actors find themselves. 
The foundation for the neo-institutionalist approach began with a focus 
upon the strategic stages of the jurisprudential decision-making process. 
For while decisions on the merits may reflect the Court's official outputs, 
these final votes derive from several earlier stages, each of which produces 
the possibility for strategic behavior. Elements of Judicial Strategy, the 
classic book by Walter Murphy, was the first text to pursue a contextual 
approach, arguing that justices act within strategic settings where they 
must behave sophisticatedly if they wish to implement their specific policy 
preferences.31 
Epstein and Knight updated and expanded Murphy's account by 
specifically considering each of the various stages of Supreme Court 
decision-making.32 They focus tremendous attention upon the institutional 
rules and norms which help inform decision-making and argue that 
because each stage creates the potential for strategic behavior, public law 
requires a methodological approach which shifts "the focus away from 
discrete acts of simple vote counting,,33 toward a more fully informed 
29 The ''New-Institutionalism'' as contemplated within the rational choice wing of political science 
builds upon the institutional economic work of Nobelist Douglass North. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE vii (1990); Douglass 
C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991); Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory 0/ 
Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355 (1990). For examples of other prominent work, see Daniel 
Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel, Institutionalism as a Methodology, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 123 (2003); 
James March & Johan Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions, 9 GoVERNANCE 247 
(1996); James March & Johan Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 734 (1984); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: The 
Institutions o/Governance, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 75 (1998). 
30 See supra note 14. 
31 MURPHY, supra note 14, at 202. 
32 EpSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14. 
33 Gillman & Clayton, supra note 28. 
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account of the institutional incentives which ultimately produce The 
Choices Justices Make. 34 
This article follows their approach as it attempts to explain Justice 
Rehnquist's otherwise anomalous behavior in Dickerson. However, before 
specifically turning to Dickerson, the article briefly outlines the strategic 
nature of various Supreme Court decision-making stages including 
certiorari, conference proceedings, opllllon assignments, and post 
assigmnent coalition maintenance. 
A. Stage 1: The Certiorari Decision 
The United States Supreme Court enjoys a unique position within the 
federal judicial system. Not only does it sit atop a structural hierarchy, but 
it also enjoys almost complete control over its agenda. While a limited 
number of cases reach this Court through either originaeS or statutory 
jurisdiction,36 the vast majority of litigants must file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to seek Supreme Court review. The Court has complete authority 
to reject these petitions37 and does so in all but a small number of cases.38 
34 EpSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 14. For other examples of work adopting some variant of the 
strategic approach see BAUM, supra note 28, at 123; MALTZMAN, supra note 28, at 4-5; and Paul Brace 
& Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 66 
(1990) (describing a strategic view of State Supreme Court decision-making). 
35 "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a 
State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 
2. 
36 See. e.g., 28 U.S.c. §§ 1254, 1257,2350 (2000); RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, 
CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 18 (3d ed. 2005). Wheeler and Harrison note that: 
[djespite the relatively modest changes in circuit structure, the federal courts 
today differ strikingly from their forerunners in 1891, and even more from those 
of 1789. The Supreme Court's limited certiorari jurisdiction in the 1891 Act has 
been broadened by successive legislation, the most noteworthy being the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, and the most recent being a 1988 act that eliminated most 
remaining categories of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. 
Id. at 24. The 1925 Judiciary Act, passed at the urging of Chief Justice and former President 
William Howard Taft, is often described as part of a larger movement towards judicial autonomy which 
occurred during the 1920s. Taft's entrepreneurialism was critical in the crafting of the modern 
judiciary, as he is responsible not only for increasing the permissive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
but also for reorganizing and bureaucratizing the federal judiciary. For a detailed description, see 
Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of 
William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL. _ (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author). 
37 SUP. CT. R. 10. Supreme Court Rule 10 states a "petition for certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons." The stated reasons include but are in no way limited to a conflict among the 
United States Courts of Appeal, a conflict between a state court of last resort and another state or 
federal court or a state or Federal court decision which deviates from "relevant decisions" of the United 
States Supreme Court. Id. 
38 "In the 1995 term, for example, the Court granted certiorari to 92 of 2456 paid certiorari petitions 
(4%) and to 13 of 5098 pauperis petitions (0.3%)." Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United 
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The specific mechanism which determines the status of a particular 
petition is a sub-majoritarian collective choice rule commonly referred to 
as "the rule of four.,,39 The rule is not actually a rule. Rather, it is an 
internal norm of the institution.40 This norm typically is observed by its 
members but not required by the United States Constitution, a federal 
statute, or the Supreme Court's own published rules.41 Its historical origins 
are somewhat clouded, yet its existence was acknowledged by various 
Justices who testified before Congress in the early 1920s.42 
As the name implies, the rule requires the votes of at least four of the 
nine justices to grant a petition for certiorari. The sub-majoritarian nature 
of the collective choice rule is juxtaposed against the final decision on the 
merits, where a majority of justices, typically five or greater, must lend 
support to a position before it can carry precedential value. This 
discontinuity between the stage decision and the final decision helps define 
the strategic context that surrounds the certiorari vote. 
To be specific, a justice must cast a vote for or against certiorari without 
perfect knowledge of how others will vote once the case is actually decided 
on the merits. Because the exact positions of the fellow justices cannot be 
perfectly obtained, a justice seeking to maximize his or her policy 
preferences at the final stage cannot be assured at the certiorari stage that a 
favorable vote will produce a favorable outcome. Therefore, the decision 
States Supreme Court: An Overview of the Social Science Studies, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 193,195 (2000) 
(citing LEE EpSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & 
DEVELOPMENTS, 83 tb1.2-6 (2d ed. 1996)). In sum, for the 1995 tenn, the Court granted certiorari in 
105 of 7554 petitions (\.3%). In more recent years, the probabilities are even less favorable to a 
would-be litigant. [d. 
39 While the "rule of four" dictates the decision with regard to certiorari, the justices, with the aid of 
their clerks, use an additional gate-keeping mechanism to ferret out meritorious petitions. Initially, a 
case must reach the "discuss list," a tally of cases which are openly considered during the justices' 
internal conference. Each case not placed upon the discuss list is automatically denied certiorari. See 
Gregory Caldeira & John Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court, 24 L. & 
SOC'y REv. 807, 808 (1990). With the exception of Justice Stevens, each of the members of the court 
participates in the "cert pool" whereby the eight participating Justices pool their respective law clerks to 
produce recommendation memoranda regarding each petition for certiorari. While the Justices are of 
course free to vote as they wish, they often follow their clerks' advice. See Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, 
The Law Clerk's Recommendations and Chief Justice Vinson's Vote on Certiorari, 18 AM. POL. Q. 68, 
70-71 (1990). 
40 The origin of the rule of four is somewhat unclear. "What evidence there is suggests strongly 
that the rule was developed by the Court itself, and that it probably came into existence about the time 
the Court first received discretionary authority, that is, shortly following the Court of Appeals Act of 
189\." Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 981 (1957). 
41 In fact, Justice Stevens discusses the interrelationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and 
the rule of four. He suggests that various changes to the Court's jurisdiction and practices make the 
rule of four less necessary and or desirable than it once was, and, also, more susceptible to change. 
John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 18-21 (1983). 
42 [d. at 10. 
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can be best described as a choice under uncertainty in which a justice, 
seeking to maximize his or her policy preferences, yet unsure of how 
colleagues ultimately might decide the case, could find it preferable to 
maintain the lower court decision rather than risk an adverse High Court, 
i.e., a ruling ideologically distant from that justice's ideal point.43 
Underlying motivation is difficult to ascribe to the certiorari votes of 
individual justices in individual cases because the comparison between the 
final votes on the merits and votes on certiorari may not necessarily 
provide insight into individual motivation.44 For example, one justice may 
vote to grant certiorari to reverse the decision of a lower court;45 another 
might vote to grant certiorari in order to nationalize the ruling below.46 
Also, since strategic interaction colors decisions at numerous stages, 
including the conference proceeding, opinion assignment, and post-
assignment bargaining, each justice must consider how other justices are 
likely to behave, not only with respect to their final votes, but throughout 
the decision process. This realization complicates analysis of voting 
patterns at each stage because justices must make discrete decisions at 
various stages which ultimately lead to a final outcome. Nevertheless, it is 
not a world of complete indeterminacy because institutional rules and 
norms help to channel choices by providing certain justices with micro-
incentives at various stages of the judicial decision-making process. 
B. Stages 2, 3, and 4: Conference Proceedings, Tentative Votes, and 
Opinion Assignments 
The certiorari stage is only the threshold stage of Supreme Court 
litigation. The next major stage is the conference, which typically follows 
oral argument. Justices gather privately to discuss the cases from the most 
recent court session. Like other points in the process, there are a number 
of social norms which accompany this gathering. One convention allows 
the chief justice to speak and vote first followed by each associate justice 
in order of seniority.47 In recent years, an additional norm allows each 
43 H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(1991); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); Robert 
Boucher & Jeffery Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Offensive Grants and 
Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 571. POL. 824 (1995). 
44 However, some argue such comparisons are fruitful. See, e.g., John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, 
Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 
335 (1990); Jan Palmer, An Economic Analysis of the u.s. Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions, 39 
PUB. CHOICE 387 (1982). 
45 Brenner, supra note 38, at 195-197. 
46 Id. at 201. 
47 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 254 (new ed. 2001). 
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justice to speak once before acquiring a second opportunity to comment. 
Prior to these opening statements, all face a degree of uncertainty regarding 
the preferences of their fellow justices. The conference proceedings reduce 
this uncertainty. In fact, as the initial discussions conclude with the 
opening statement of the most junior associate justice, the formerly 
uncertain landscape is far more certain. 
The potential for revealed preferences frame the strategic interaction at 
this stage. For example, some argue there are significant incentives for 
certain justices to deviate from the tentative voting norm.48 By 
strategically passing, a justice can maximize information prior to casting a 
tentative vote. The actor with the greatest incentive to engage in this 
behavior is the chief justice because he can gamer the potential power of 
opinion assignment ifhe finds himself in the majority.49 By voting last, the 
chief justice can ascertain the tentative ideological distribution of his 
fellow justices before casting his vote, thereby maximizing his probability 
of acting as an opinion assignor. 
There is some empirical evidence of such behavior in the historical 
records of conference proceedings. 50 Chief Justice Burger, for example, is 
reputed to have strategically passed or changed his tentative vote in a 
number of politically salient cases.51 In many instances, this behavior 
assured him a place with the majority, thereby securing to him the power 
of opinion assignment. 
Much like certiorari votes, it is difficult to ascribe specific motivation to 
this passing decision as there can be both non-strategic and strategic 
motives underlying the observed behavior. However, with the referenced 
empirical support, the balance of the paper assumes a chief justice may 
always use his role as administrator of the conference either strategically to 
pass or change his vote to gamer the power of opinion assignment. 
Figure 1.1 is a flowchart which captures the various stages of decision-
making that face the chief justice. It is not a formal game-theoretic model 
with a specific equilibrium prediction, but instead is simply a graphical 
representation of internal Supreme Court proceedings which define the 
path to a final decision on the merits. For ease, the diagram excludes 
certain complications such as plurality groupings, i.e., instances where no 
coalition can secure a majority. This simple figure demonstrates that there 
48 Timothy R. Johnson et aI., Passing and Strategic Voting on the u.s. Supreme Court, 39 LAW & 
SOC'y REv. 349 (2005). 
49 !d.; see also White, supra note 14. 
50 Johnson et aI., supra note 48. 
51 !d. 
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are a number of combinations of "states of the world" and sub-decisions 
which can produce a final observed vote by the chief justice. 
Conditioned on the notion that the Court has granted certiorari, the 
figure begins with two potential branches. These branches capture two 
different states of the world in which, as assumed above,52 the chief can 
observe prior to making his tentative voting decision. Together, nodes 2A 
and 2B collapse the spectrum of potential vote distributions into two 
distinct branches. Bracketing the more complicated case of plurality, the 
conference vote can either produce four or more votes for a policy position 
which is in line with the chiefs own preferred position, or it can yield five 
or more votes for a contrary position. In the former instance, the strategic 
chief need not be strategic. Rather, he can simply vote his true, unbounded 
policy preference within the conference and still preserve for himself the 
power of opinion assignment. In that vein, node 3D is included only for 
analytical clarity.53 It should never occur since a chief has no reason to 
vote against his policy preference when that preference has majority 
support. 
The more complex decision for a strategic chief justice is how best to 
maximize his given policy preferences in a context where his preferences 
are unaligned with the majority of the Court.54 The Figure's upper branch 
reflects a state of the world where five or more votes support a position 
disfavored by the chief justice. If he maintains his genuine position, the 
chief will find himself in the minority, where his position has little chance 
of realization due to the loss of agenda control over the matter. 55 Thus, a 
strategic chief justice must decide whether it would best serve his policy 
goals to vote faithfully or sophisticatedly. 56 
52 See Johnson et aI., supra note 48. At least in politically salient cases, the chief can ignore the 
norm which typically finds the chief casting the first tentative vote. Alternatively, he could also 
strategically modity his vote following the tentative voting by his fellow justices. 
53 It is a typical convention in decision trees and game theoretic models to outline all theoretically 
possible outcomes. This includes potential choices such as 3D, a choice which the actor has absolutely 
no incentive to adopt. Specifically, a chief who possesses four or more votes for his preferred outcome 
has no incentive to vote against his true preferences. Instead, he has every incentive to vote his true 
preferences, as this will provide a majority for his preferred view and allow him to maintain agenda 
control over the matter. 
54 Theodore Arrington & Saul Brenner, Strategic Voting for Damage Control on the Supreme 
Court, 57 POL. REs. Q. 565 (2004). "At least nine different highly respected Supreme Court scholars 
assert that the justices on the Court, whether they are likely opinion assigners or not, will sometimes 
vote insincerely at the conference vote and with the majority in order to pursue damage control." Id. at 
565. The authors cite a number of recent papers presented at major conferences, as well as some 
books. For an example of such works, see DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (5th ed. 2000). 
55 See Arrington & Brenner, supra note 54. 
56Id. 
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As noted earlier, if the chief justice elects to vote with the majority, he 
has the power to select the author of the Court's opinion. Yet, this 
authority transfers to the most senior associate justice when the chief finds 
himself outside of the majority. When voting in the shadow of the rule for 
opinion assignment, a voter must consider a variety of factors including the 
salience of the case at issue, the ideological distance between the chief 
justice and the court majority, and the ideological distance between the 
chief and the senior associate justice likely to be in the majority.57 
However, regardless of whether the chief initially finds himself on the 
strategic path at node 4A or the non-strategic path at 4B, he still faces a 
decision with respect to whom to assign the task of drafting the opinion of 
the Court. The Court's internal norm empowers him to assign the opinion 
to himself or to another justice within the winning coalition. Principally, 
this decision could take a variety of forms. Yet, since writing an opinion is 
a timely enterprise, and each justice is resource-constrained, an assignor 
cannot elect to retain every opinion. The assignor chief therefore must 
choose to assign some subset of the cases over which he initially has 
agenda control. 
The chief could employ either a strategic or non-strategic decision rule 
to guide this choice. For example, the assignor chief could randomly 
assign the opinion to a member of the winning coalition. Alternatively, the 
assignor could follow a parity rule, assigning the case to a coalition justice 
with the fewest number of outstanding assignments. A knowledge rule 
could also guide the assignment decision whereby the drafting task is 
delegated to a justice with particular expertise within the relevant subject 
domain. Such non-strategic notions almost certainly motivate some of the 
chief's assignment decisions. 58 
Yet this decision, like all others on the path to the final decision on the 
merits, contains the conditions for strategic behavior. The scholarship 
argues that opinion assignment can follow a number of strategic paths. For 
example, a strategic assignor might choose to assign cases to "an 
ideologically moderate justice" in the unstable coalition as part of a co-
57 For consideration of the calculus of opinion assignment, see Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
421, 425-26 (1996) (discussing some of the factors that affect case assignment). 
58 Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on the 
Supreme Court, 57 POL. REs. Q. 551 (2004). Maltzman and Wahlbeck find that "[f]ar from single 
mindedly seeking ideological gains, the chief justice pursues multiple goals through his power of 
opinion assignment .... " Id. at 36. Further, they find that "[a]s a Court term nears completion, the 
chief is less concerned with equity, expertise and ideology and more concerned with efficiency." Id. 
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option strategy. 59 Alternatively, the chief may choose to retain the case or 
assign the opinion to a justice closely aligned with his position in an effort 
to yield a final opinion close to his ideal point. 60 The specific facts of the 
case as well as the nature of the coalition will ultimately frame the chief's 
choice at the assignment stage. 
C. Stages 5 & 6: Post-Opinion Assignment Bargaining and Final 
Observed Behavior 
If the chief chooses to bear the cost of opinion writing, the strategic 
setting does not abate. Rather, either the chief or his assignee must focus 
attention upon maintaining agreement within the coalition. Thus, he or she 
must bargain with fellow coalition members regarding both the language 
and tone of the opinion.61 The need for relative consensus provides the 
drafter with only bounded authority over the substance of the majority 
oplmon. The ideological distance between the author and remaining 
coalition members greatly influences the probability of coalition 
maintenance. Strife contains a downside risk for the opinion drafter 
because the quest to pull the decision toward his or her personal policy 
preference could result in the splinter of the coalition. Figure 1.1 
contemplates a coalition splinter through nodes 5A and 5B for the chief 
justice and 5E and 5F for the assignee. 
If the coalition dissolves and a new drafter arises, a chief must make a 
calculated response. He may join the new opinion drafter at 6A or 6B, 
dissent from the new opinion at 6C and 6D, or file some sort of mixture of 
concurrence and dissent at 6E and 6F. Finally, because of incomplete 
information a chief may initially assign an opinion to a fellow coalition 
member who ultimately drafts an opinion with which the chief disagrees. 
Thus, in response to arriving at either 5G or 5H, the chief may reply with 
terminal actions 60, 6Q, or 6P, 6R, respectively. 
This brief review of Figure 1.1 demonstrates that the chief is a unique 
player in the judicial decision-making process. Although he has been 
called a "first among equals," it is unclear whether this label is 
59 Maltzman & Wahlbeck. supra note 57, at 426. 
60 Id. 
61 See James Spriggs et aI., Bargaining on the u.s. Supreme Court: Justices' Responses to 
Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485 (1999). The authors write that "once the opinion draft is 
circulated, 'the fur begins to fly'" (quoting Tom Clark, Internal Operation of the United States 
Supreme Court, 43 JUDICATURE 45,51 (1959)). See also PHILLIP COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: 
CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1995); Paul Wahlbeck et aI., Marshalling the Court: 
Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. 1. POL. SCI. 294 (1998). 
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understated.62 Substantial institutional authority surrounds his position. 
The chief is the only player on the Supreme Court for whom the strategic 
path, i.e., the ability to vote with the majority at 3A despite his underlying 
disagreement, is always available. 
The chief also possesses exclusive administrative authority over the 
proceedings as well as the conditional power of opinion assignment. In a 
world of complete information without costs, these institutional powers 
might be of limited import. However, because Supreme Court decision-
making is one where actors must cast votes with limited information and 
where significant costs attach to alternative coalition formation, 
institutional rules matter, and those rules clearly favor the chief. 63 
III. THE EVIDENCE FROM DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES 
"You have the right to remain silent. If you give up that 
right, anything you say can and will be used against you in 
a court of law. You have the right to an attorney and to 
have an attorney present during questioning. If you cannot 
afford an attorney, one will be provided to yoU.,,64 
Hardly an hour of a television police drama passes without the recital of 
these famous words, the warnings which have come to be identified with 
the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona. The Miranda 
decision remade the topography of confessional jurisprudence by requiring 
62 See White, supra note 14. 
63 This agenda control account described herein is familiar to many political scientists. 
Congressional scholars, in particular, have long argued that institutional rules and norms provide 
agenda control. This agenda control favors certain actors and potentially distorts the outputs of the 
legislative branch. For but a small sample of this extensive literature, see GARY W. Cox & MATHEW 
D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GoVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (2005); Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agenda Power in the u.s. House 
of Representatives, 1877 - 1986, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 107 (David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 
2002); Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 169 (2000); Kenneth A. 
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 
503 (1981); Kenneth Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987); Susan Webb Yackee, Punctuating the Congressional 
Agenda: Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders, 56 POL. RES. Q. 139 (2003). 
64 The opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not specifically delineate any 
exact wording which the warnings must follow. Therefore, jurisdictions employ some variant of the 
warnings cited above. Chief Justice Warren's opinion, however, does describe the required core 
components which a warning should include: the right to remain silent, id. at 467-68, that silence will 
not be used against an individual, id. at 468, that anything said can and will be used against the 
individual, id. at 469, the right to counsel, id. at 471, and the provision of counsel for indigent 
individuals, id. at 472. 
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that all individuals subject to a custodial interrogation be apprised of both 
their Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination as well as 
their Sixth Amendment right to counse1.65 Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
speaking for the Court majority, crafted the relatively controversial bright-
line rule requiring suppression of all. custodial confessions obtained in the 
absence of the warnings-regardless of whether the confession was 
"coerced" or "involuntary" in the traditional pre-Miranda sense. 
The Miranda decision expanded upon an existing regime called the 
voluntariness test, a criterion which required that all statements be 
voluntarily provided. The origins of that standard can be traced to English 
common law, as the courts of England typically rejected involuntary 
confessions on reliability grounds. The United States Supreme Court 
imported the voluntariness standard through the 1897 decision in Bram v. 
United States. 66 Bram and its progeny established that trial courts were 
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding a confession in order to ensure that the 
statement was voluntarily provided. This totality approach is rather 
amorphous and arguably provided little guidance to authorities regarding 
the boundaries of acceptable conduct. Therefore, even prior to the Court's 
decision in Miranda, law enforcement organizations such as the FBI 
provided similar warnings to those mandated in Miranda to ensure that 
statements would survive a voluntariness hearing.67 
Even today, the mere provision of the warnings does not absolve the 
police from a voluntariness challenge because Miranda did not replace the 
voluntariness requirement; it only acted as an additional layer of 
protection. Thus, voluntariness continues to be a required component of 
the constitutional analysis and a reviewing court still can deem a custodial 
environment excessively coercive even if the Miranda warnings preceded 
a custodial confession.68 
6S Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
66 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
67 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 552-58 (ilthed. 2005). For a more 
general discussion, see Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on 
Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963). 
68 For a brief description see KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 67, at 715. See also, e.g., United States 
v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337,343 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that despite Miranda warnings, juvenile'S 
confession made while in custody was suppressed due to the coercive nature of an illegal arrest); In Re 
Andre M., 88 P.3d 552 (Ariz. 2004) (finding juvenile's waiver of right to remain silent after Miranda 
warnings insufficient to overcome coercive atmosphere where mother was excluded from 
interrogation). 
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The Miranda decision created substantial unrest and confusion which 
its opponents, most notably William Rehnquist, exploited.69 Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion contained a series of seemingly contradictory statements 
that, when viewed in isolation, undercut the basis for the Court's holding.70 
Namely, it did not delineate whether the warnings were constitutionally 
mandated or instead were merely a sub-constitutional, common law 
requirement. Chief Justice Warren noted that "[0 Jur decision in no way 
creates a constitutional straitjacket" and "we cannot say that the 
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution.,,71 
Furthermore, the Court appeared to invite Congress and the states to craft 
alternative mechanisms.72 Taken together, this language favored the notion 
that Miranda was a common law holding since Congress and state 
governments are not empowered to craft constitutional standards through 
statutes. Yet, the Court provided an important caveat which frustrated any 
common law interpretation. Chief Justice Warren noted, "However, unless 
we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising 
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.,,73 
Congress purported to follow the Court's invitation and a crafted a 
standard designed to quell the substantial public outcry which followed the 
Miranda decision. Through the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act,74 Congress adopted a standard for evaluating custodial 
interrogations that was nearly identical to the prior voluntariness analysis. 75 
69 See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 114-19. 
7°Id. Professor Kamisar describes how Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433 (1974), took language in the Miranda opinion out of context, thereby vectoring the future of 
the doctrine far away from Chief Justice Warren's original opinion. 
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. For a more complete discussion, see Kamisar, supra note 4, at 114-19. 
74 Ominibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 
197,210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000». 
75 § 350 I provides, in part, as follows: 
(a) [AJ confession ... shall be admissible ... if it is voluntarily given. Before 
such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence 
of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines 
that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the 
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of 
voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as 
the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. 
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into 
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, 
including (I) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment ... , (2) whether 
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Such an obvious rebuke to the Miranda decision promised that final 
resolution of Miranda's constitutional status would soon obtain. However, 
its ultimate interpretation was stymied as every subsequent President and 
respective Attorney General refused to implement § 3501.76 For more than 
thirty years, the constitutionality of the statutory provision and thus 
Miranda remained in flux. 
Groundwork for the ultimate resolution of the question began in Davis 
v. United States,77 where Justice Scalia noted that the Court finally should 
visit the constitutionality of § 3501.78 Soon thereafter, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed Justice Scalia's suggestion.79 The 
stage was ready for the ultimate review of the question by the nation's 
highest court. 
A. The Facts and Procedural History o/Dickerson v. United States 
January 24, 1997, began like any other day at the First Virginia Bank. 
Tellers filled their drawers while the branch manager oversaw the start of 
business. Customers entered the premises and conducted a variety of 
transactions including deposits, withdrawals, and check cashing. The 
normality of the day, however, vanished when an individual brandishing a 
semi-automatic handgun entered the bank and demanded money. The 
tellers quickly complied while bank customers and other employees waited 
fearfully. The suspect collected the proceeds and quickly fled. 80 
Officers arrived and diligently secured the scene. Their investigation 
immediately produced a witness who saw the suspect leave the bank. He 
described the suspect and provided police with a license plate number from 
Id. 
such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of 
which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not 
such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any 
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or 
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the 
assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the 
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. 
76 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]ith limited 
exceptions the provision has been studiously avoided by every Administration, not only in this Court 
but in the lower courts, since its enactment more than 25 years ago."). 
77 Id. at 462-65. 
78 "As far as I am concerned, such a time will have arrived when a case that comes within the terms 
ofthis statute is next presented to us." Id. at 464. 
79 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
80Id. at 673. 
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the getaway car.81 The plate matched a white Oldsmobile registered to 
Charles Dickerson of Takoma Park, Maryland.82 
FBI agents visited Mr. Dickerson at his residence and asked him to 
accompany them voluntarily to the local field office for questioning.83 He 
was not arrested,84 although he later testified he felt he had no choice but to 
go to the FBI office.85 Initially, Mr. Dickerson denied participation in the 
bank robbery.86 A warrant was obtained to search his apartment.87 When 
told of the warrant and the imminent search, Dickerson admitted to being 
the getaway driver88 and was arrested.89 The search yielded incriminating 
evidence including the handgun, dye-stained money, masks, and a bait bill 
from a prior robbery.90 
Mr. Dickerson's attorney sought to suppress the statement and the 
outcome of the search, arguing the confession was obtained in violation of 
Miranda.91 The trial court granted the defense motion.92 In response, the 
government first filed a motion to reconsider, providing additional 
information about the circumstances and arguing the statements were 
voluntary and, therefore, admissible under § 3501.93 When this motion 
was denied,94 the prosecutor filed an immediate interlocutory appeal asking 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to reinstate Mr. Dickerson's 
confession.95 While the government initially pursued a § 3501 claim in the 
motion to reconsider in the district court, on appeal it instead pursued its 
claim under the more difficult but less controversial traditional Miranda 





85 Id. at n.2. 
86Id. at 673. 
87 Id. at 673-74. 




92Id. at 675. 
93 Id. at 676. 
94 Id. at 677. The district court did not address the government's claim under § 3501, relying 
instead on Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Dickerson, 971 
F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (£.0. Va. 1997). 
95 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 677. 
96 Brief for the United States at n.19, id. (No. 97-4750). 
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claim sua sponte.97 In so doing, the court followed Justice Scalia's 
suggestion in Davis v. United States. 98 
In order to properly consider § 3501, the Fourth Circuit invited 
prominent Miranda critic Paul Cassell to present the sua sponte 
argument. 99 On the strength of his argument, the Fourth Circuit 
subsequently held § 3501 was an appropriate standard under which to 
consider Mr. Dickerson's confession. 1Oo Under that standard, it reversed 
the District Court and reinstated the defendant's confession. 101 Mr. 
Dickerson's attorney challenged the Fourth Circuit's ruling by appealing to 
the United States Supreme Court. The High Court granted the defendant's 
petition and set the case for oral argument. 102 
B. Keeping Your Enemies Closer: Chief Justice Rehnquist 's Decision in 
Dickerson 
As the Supreme Court's 2000 term drew to a close, many significant 
issues remained. From determining the constitutionality of restrictions on 
partial birth abortion to the permissibility of California's blanket primary, 
weighty issues of social significance awaited resolution. June 26, 2000, 
brought some answers. The day began with the rendering of the Court's 
opinion in California Democratic Party v. Jones 103 in which the Court 
invalidated the aforementioned blanket primary. The second and final 
decision of the day, however, substantially overshadowed this first 
decision by providing some closure to a nearly thirty-five year debate 
regarding Miranda's constitutionality. 
Prior to the Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States,104 even 
Miranda's strongest supporters had significant reason for concern. A 
decision upholding its constitutionality required the Supreme Court not 
only to rebuke the Congressional effort to legislatively limit Miranda, but 
also to disagree with the Fourth Circuit, an appellate court with whom the 
97 Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672 ("[T]he Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this 
case under governing law [§ 3501] simply by refusing to argue it."). 
98 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
99 The Justice Department's unwillingness to advance the § 3501 argument required the court to 
appoint Professor Cassell. The Fourth Circuit's opinion contains a detailed and lengthy description of 
its displeasure with the position taken by the government regarding § 3501. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 
680-82. 
100 Id. at 672. 
101 Id. at 695. 
102 The Supreme Court similarly appointed Professor Cassell to argue the § 350 I theory. Solicitor 
General Seth Waxman, acting in an amicus capacity, argued against the enforcement of the statute. 
103 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
104 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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Supreme Court often sided. Yet, the most troubling hurdle that stood in 
front of Miranda's continued viability was the prior voting record of the 
Court's membership. In particular, given his history there was substantial 
reason to believe Chief Justice Rehnquist would use Dickerson to finally 
purge the confessional jurisprudence of Chief Justice Warren's 
controversial 1966 decision. 
Ultimately this concern was unrealized as Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a 
7-2 majority opinion, declared Miranda to be a constitutional rule, thereby 
invalidating Congress's 1968 attempt to nullify it. 105 To support this 
proposition, the Chief argued that the Miranda court majority believed it 
imposed a constitutional rule because it specifically stated that it had 
granted certiorari to "give concrete constitutional guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies and courts to follow.,,106 Further evidence of its 
constitutionality was demonstrated through Miranda's application against 
the states. 107 Specifically, because the Supreme Court typically refuses to 
apply non-constitutional mandates upon state authorities, and Miranda's 
mandate upon state authorities was clear from its caption, Miranda had to 
be a constitutional decision. 
Beyond the doctrinal rationales, the Chief also relied upon several 
policy justifications. First, he noted that in the years since its initial 
decision Miranda had become part of the "national culture.,,108 Essentially, 
he argued that although there was initial opposition to Miranda, it had 
through subsequent modification become a rule which both law 
enforcement and the public had come to accept. Of great significance, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the doctrine of stare decisis also 
counseled against overruling Miranda. As cited earlier, "Whether or not 
we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we 
addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis 
weigh heavily against overruling it now.,,109 
The Chief recognized the confusion of the Court of Appeals. I 10 In 
particular, his opinion notes how the lower court focused upon language 
contained in a series of post-Miranda decisions-opinions written by 
105 Id. at 438. 
106Id. at 439 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-442) (emphasis added). 
107 Id. at 438. 
108Id. at 443. 
109 Id. 
II°Id. at 438. The Chiefs recognition is only fair since it is Justice Rehnquist who created much of 
the confusion in the first place. Professor Kamisar argues, "I doubt that any justice in Supreme Court 
history has dismissed his own majority opinions more summarily or nonchalantly" than Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in Dickerson. Kamisar, supra note 4, at 120. 
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Justice Rehnquist himself. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit "relied on the 
fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its 
rule."ll1 For Rehnquist, "These decisions illustrate the principle-not that 
Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is 
immutable.,,112 He further stated, "If anything, our subsequent cases have 
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement 
while reaffirming the decision's core ruling .... ,,113 
C. Uniqueness Claims and The Problem of Observational Equivalence 
For many, the surprising part of Dickerson was not so much the 
underlying result but rather the Chief's position as author for the Court's 
majority. The Chief's opinion was such a vast departure from his prior 
reasoning that it left many scholars grappling for some sort of unifying 
doctrinal explanation. As noted earlier, many candidate theories purport to 
advance the unique explanation for Justice Rehnquist's observed 
behavior.114 However, for a variety of reasons, these current explanations 
ultimately prove wanting. 
First, most observers focus their doctrinal theses upon the wrong 
justice, since despite his authorship, it is not the Chief so much as Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor who were likely swayed by such prudential 
considerations. I IS Yet, most importantly, much of the current scholarship 
is at best incomplete because it entertains only a non-strategic view of 
Supreme Court decision-making. 
In Part II, the article argued that Supreme Court decision-making is 
more than the final observed decision. The process contains a series of 
important procedural stages, each of which produces the conditions for 
strategic behavior. While not every judicial outcome is the byproduct of a 
sophisticated maneuver, the prospect looms in every discrete case. Thus, 
any candidate explanation must successfully account for this possibility. 
Simply put, no uniqueness claim is supportable without complete 
consideration and refutation of potential alternative explanations. This 
point is demonstrated clearly through Figure 1.1. Therein, symmetry exists 
between upper and lower branches as virtually every upper trunk branch 
has a corresponding lower trunk complement. Although similar and in 
III Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 44l. 
112 Id. 
113Id. at 443. 
114 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
lIS See Cruz, supra note 2, at 14 ("As a practical matter, there was no way that Justice O'Connor or 
Justice Kennedy would possibly be willing to overrule Miranda. It was too established, too much a 
part of the legal firmament, for either ofthem to hazard extinguishing it."). 
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many ways observationally equivalent, the branches are not, in fact, 
identical. For example, the path to terminal branches 6A and 6B, i.e., 
where the Chief Justice joins the New Opinion Drafter, may appear 
similar. However, these two cases differ materially in stage 2. 
The observable facts of Dickerson as applied to Figure 1.1 demonstrate 
the difficulty with supporting a uniqueness claim. In Dickerson, the Chief 
voted with the majority, thereby garnering the power of opinion 
assignment. After assigning the opinion to himself, he successfully 
bargained with his fellow justices, thereby sustaining his coalition. Each 
of these observable facts is consistent with terminal branches 6G and 6H, 
respectively. Much like those branches discussed above, while branches 
6G and 6H feature deceivingly similar final outcomes, they are not 
analogous; terminal branch 6G reflects strategic behavior while its 
counterpart, 6H, reflects a genuine, non-strategic path to the final outcome. 
With two candidate explanations, only one of which can accurately 
reflect the true state of the world, query as to how to adjudicate between 
competing potential accounts? This article follows the available evidence 
reflected in Chief Justice Rehnquist's pre- and post-Dickerson Miranda-
related jurisprudence. I 16 This evidence overwhelmingly favors 6G, the 
strategic explanation, as the unique explanation for the Chiefs otherwise 
anomalous behavior in Dickerson v. United States. 
D. Evaluating the Evidence: Justice Rehnquist 's Prior Miranda 
Jurisprudence 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's treatment of Miranda prior to Dickerson 
could hardly be deemed supportive of the rule. At virtually every turn, he 
sided against the 1966 ruling. Rehnquist first encountered Miranda while 
working for the Department of Justice. Through an April 1, 1969, 
memorandum, then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist first disparaged 
Chief Justice Warren's holding by suggesting that the President impanel a 
commission to consider a constitutional amendment to overturn 
Miranda. ll ? Two months later, another memorandum, one with which 
Rehnquist was likely familiar and perhaps even authored, circulated 
throughout the Nixon Justice Department. This second memo outlined a 
set of litigation strategies designed to undercut the impact of the Miranda 
116 At this point, the available evidence is limited to publicly observable voting behavior. Future 
research should review the internal conference notes and memoranda if and when such material 
becomes accessible. 
117 Kamisar, supra note 4, at \09. 
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ruling.118 As Professor Kamisar has noted, the memo "foreshadowed the 
reasoning in later Supreme Court opinions disparaging Miranda.,,119 
"Indeed, looking back on the memorandum more than three decades later, 
it seems to have provided a road map for those who wanted to read 
Miranda as narrowly as possible.,,120 
Just over two years later, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist was 
nominated and then confirmed to the United States Supreme Court. 121 
Despite his recent entry to the institution, the newly minted Justice 
Rehnquist authored one of the first major post-Miranda rulings. In 
Michigan v. Tucker,122 he began his more than quarter century of Miranda 
decisions by substantially limiting the scope of the doctrine. Rehnquist 
focused attention upon the specific text ofChiefJustice Warren's Miranda 
opinion, noting that the Constitution does not require "adherence to any 
particular solution.,,123 To Justice Rehnquist, this implied the Miranda 
warnings were less than fully constitutional. Therefore, in the Tucker 
opinion, he referred to them as "protective guidelines,,124 or "recommended 
procedural safeguards.,,125 
Following Tucker, Justice Rehnquist's continued his contribution to 
Miranda's de-constitutionalization. Whether in the majority or minority, 
Rehnquist cast consistent votes to minimize the reach of the doctrine. For 
example, in North Carolina v. Butler,126 he agreed with the majority that, 
for Miranda purposes, an explicit waiver of an attorney is not required if 
the facts and circumstances support the notion that a waiver was executed. 
In Rhode Island v. Innis,I27 he voted to allow police to speak to an accused 
while transporting him even after the accused has invoked his right to 
counsel, as long as the conversation was not designed to produce 
incriminating statements. In Jenkins v. Anderson,128 he joined a majority 
which permitted the State to impeach an accused who chooses to testify 
118Id. at 112-13. Even though the exact authorship of the second memorandum is unclear, it 
follows that through his administrative role as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, a division 
which often provides opinions regarding the constitutionality of federal legislation, Assistant Attorney 
General Rehnquist must have been aware of, ifnot explicitly approved of, its contents. Id. at 113-14. 
119Id. 
120Id. at 113. 
121 William H. Rehnquist was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
on January 7, 1972. 
122417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
123 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966). 
124417 U.S. at 443. 
125 Id.; see a/so Kamisar, supra note 4, at 116. 
126 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
127 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
128 447 U.S. 231 (\980). 
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using his pre-arrest silence. Later, in New York v. Quarles,129 Justice 
Rehnquist crafted a majority opinion creating a public safety exception to 
Miranda. The OpInIOn relies heavily upon the notion of sub-
constitutionality which he originally advanced in Tucker. 
A year later, in Oregon v. Elstad,130 Justice Rehnquist joined an opinion 
authored by Justice O'Connor in which the Court substantially limited the 
reach of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.l31 Like Quarles, the 
Elstad opinion relied heavily on Tucker, a move which appeared to solidify 
the notion of Miranda's sub-constitutionality into the landscape of 
confessional jurisprudence. In sum, between his decision in Tucker and his 
elevation to Chief,132 in essentially all of the thirty-three Miranda-related 
cases he encountered, Justice Rehnquist voted to limit the scope of the 
Court's original 1966 ruling. 133 
129 467 u.s. 649 (1984). 
IJO 470 u.s. 298 (1985). 
131 The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). It references the application of the exclusionary rule to 
secondary or derivative evidence obtained as a byproduct of an underlying illegal action by authorities. 
The court is left to detennine whether such evidence is "tainted" by the violative act. For a discussion 
of the history and application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, see KAM1SAR ET AL., supra 
note 67, at 702-15, 906-22. 
132 William H. Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States on September 26, 
1986. 
133 Arguably in all thirty-three major Miranda related cases within the time period, Justice 
Rehnquist either distinguished or otherwise voted to limit the core doctrine. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298 (1985) (finding that a statement made after receiving Miranda warning admissible even 
though the same statement had been made before the warning); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding that the new Miranda standard decided while case was on 
appeal should not apply when police properly relied upon old rule); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 
(1984) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that police should be allowed to inquire as to 
whether accused's words actually invoked Miranda rights); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) 
(affirming that roadside questioning does not constitute "custodial interrogation" for purposes of 
Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding a public safety exception to Miranda 
exists when police ask for location of weapon hidden in public supermarket); Solem v. Stumes, 465 
U.S. 638 (1984) (holding that Edwards was not retroactive as it does not enhance truth finding function 
of court, it was not foreshadowed, police relied upon prior standard, and retroactivity "would have a 
disruptive effect on administration of justice"); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (stating that 
no Miranda warning needed when accused made incriminating statements to probation officer during 
required meeting, even when the "probation officer consciously sought incriminating evidence"); 
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam) (refusing to require Miranda rights to be read 
when the defendant voluntarily went to the police station); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) 
(clarifying that after invoking Miranda rights, accused can initiate conversation that eventually leads to 
admissible incriminating statements); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (holding that 
"admission into evidence of defendant's refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test does not offend his 
privilege against self-incrimination" and requires no warning at the time of refusal); Taylor v. 
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing confession after illegal arrest should 
be admitted into evidence, given Miranda warning, lack of police intimidation, intervening events, and 
lack of continuous interrogation); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (concluding that 
since defendant chose to testify, his post-arrest silence can be used for impeachment); California v. 
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This article contends that institutional rules matter and thus, following 
his elevation to Chief, the strategic environment arguably changed for 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. As a result, one might expect to observe unusual 
and potentially strategic voting patterns by the now-Chief Justice. In 
reality, for many Miranda-related cases following his elevation, strategic 
Prysock, 453 U.s. 355 (1981) (per curiam) (deciding that "content of Miranda warnings need not be a 
virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda opinion"); Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (refusing to create a new per se rule requiring defendant to 
initiate communication after invoking his Miranda rights); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that he does not find a right to counsel at a pre-trial medical 
examination, though notice needed to be given if the doctor was to testify); California v. Prysock, 451 
U.S. 1301 (1981) (ordering stay on judgment reversing conviction due to inadequate warning under 
Miranda); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that post-
arrest conversation between defendant and a government informant should not require Miranda 
warning to be admissible); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that prearrest silence can 
be used to impeach a testifying defendant); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (finding 
statement by defendant to police after invocation of Miranda rights admissible so long as police did not 
expressly question the defendant or know that their comments were "reasonably likely" to provoke 
incriminating response); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) (permitting defendant's failure 
to cooperate with police to be used as aggravating factor to secure consecutive sentences); Fare v. 
Michael C., 442 U.S. 7071 (1978) (distinguishing that request to speak to probation officer is not per se 
invocation of Miranda rights); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that even after an illegal arrest, "voluntary" incriminating statements given in police custody 
after a Miranda warning should be admissible); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) 
(requiring no explicit waiver of right to an attorney as long as facts and circumstances support such a 
conclusion); Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310 (1978) (granting state request for stay of California 
Supreme Court ruling that juvenile request for probation officer constitutes invocation of Miranda 
rights); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Blackrnun, J., dissenting) (arguing that, after a 
defendant has asserted his right to counsel, police comments on desire to find and preserve body of 
victim were not "interrogation" and defendant's responses should be admissible if voluntary, even 
without an express waiver of Miranda rights); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) 
(concluding that interrogation of suspect at police station who came voluntarily and was allowed to 
leave without hindrance was not "custodial" for purposes of Miranda rule, even if police informed man 
he was a suspect and lied about evidence they had against him); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutors should be allowed to use post-arrest silence to 
impeach defendants who choose to testify); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (finding 
that "putative" defendant need not be given Miranda warnings when called to testify to a grand jury 
and false statements can be used to bring perjury charges); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 
(1976) (holding that non-custodial interview by Internal Revenue agents about tax liability of defendant 
does not require Miranda warnings); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (holding that 
incriminatory disclosure on tax return not protected under Fifth Amendment, as defendant could have 
claimed privilege against self-incrimination on return); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) 
(finding no Miranda violation if accused invoked right to silence before one detective and hours later is 
interviewed by a different one on a different matter, so long as first request "was scrupulously honored" 
as to the first case); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (concluding that evidence gained as a 
result of interrogation prior to Miranda decision upon warning of right to counsel but no warning of 
state's willingness to provide one at no cost if needed need not be excluded, given adherence of police 
to the law of the time and reliability of the evidence). In the only Miranda-related Supreme Court 
decision considered by Justice Rehnquist prior to Tucker, Justice Rehnquist again voted to limit the 
core holding of Miranda. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (agreeing with the Court's holding that police need not inform a person of the right to 
refuse for a consent search to be voluntary). 
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behavior was simply unnecessary. Specifically, with respect to limiting the 
Miranda doctrine, Justice Rehnquist had willing partners in Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy.134 Their support allowed the Chief to vote his 
"genuine" preferences without concem. 135 
\34 The Chief Justice must have known that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had a substantial 
history supporting his position on Miranda. Of the most significant Miranda opinions decided since 
she joined the Court in September 1981, Justice O'Connor supported Chief Justice Rehnquist twenty-
five times. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697 
(1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 50 I U.S. 171 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (Parts I, II, 
lIlA, IV); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan 
v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 
U.S. 285 (1988): Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U. S. 564 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 637 (1986) (Rehnquist, C. 1., 
dissenting); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 61, 65 (1985) (White, 1., dissenting and, also separately, Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); South Dakota 
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). Justice Kennedy 
commenced his service in February 1988. Although his mutual association was shorter than Justice 
O'Connor, out of fourteen opportunities, he voted ten times exactly with the position of the Chief 
Justice. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); 
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 
344 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1990); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); 
Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). To be considered a common vote, 
the positions must be exact. For example, the Chief Justice might join with a concurring opinion of the 
Associate Justice. This would be an exact match. If the Chief and Associate Justice wrote separate 
concurring opinions, this would not be an exact match, even though the two opinions might take similar 
positions. Per curiam decisions also were excluded as these tend to be rather routine matters. The 
decisions of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy to vote in favor of the constitutionality of Miranda must 
have conveyed a powerful message to the Chief Justice. 
135 In the time between his elevation and his opinion in Dickerson, the Rehnquist Court considered 
an additional twenty-four Miranda related cases. In each of these cases, just as before his elevation, 
Justice Rehnquist took every possible opportunity to undercut, distinguish or otherwise limit the initial 
Miranda decision. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the trial court was best suited to determine if the accused was in custody and in so doing it held no 
Miranda violation); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (concluding that when a request for a 
lawyer is ambiguous, the questioning can continue without a Miranda violation); Stansbury v. 
California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam) (finding that custody is an objective, not subjective, 
standard); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (stating that there is no federal habeas relief for a Miranda violation); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619 (1993) (finding that a Miranda violation occurred but it was harmless error based on facts 
of case); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1992) (holding that Miranda is not violated if the accused 
elects to speak to a fellow inmate placed undercover in his cell); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 
(1991) (holding that there is no federal indirect attack for Miranda violations); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 
501 U.S. 171 (1991) (deciding that an accused who had counsel for one crime can be questioned for 
another crime after Miranda warnings); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that an accused who had counsel, and consulted with counsel, could waive his 
Miranda rights and be questioned further by police); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) 
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part) (stating that 
questioning for driving under the influence of alcohol, in the absence of Miranda, is non-testimonial 
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For example, consider New York v. Harris,136 where the now-Chief 
Justice voted that even after a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule did not apply to a subsequent 
incriminating statement made after Miranda warnings were given. In 
Illinois v. Perkins,137 he joined a court majority that declared Miranda was 
not violated when an undercover inmate elicited a statement from a fellow 
inmate. In Withrow v. Williams,138 Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent that 
voted to exclude Miranda violations from federal habeas review. Finally, 
in Davis v. United States,139 he supported an opinion that held that so long 
as the request for a lawyer was ambiguous, questioning could continue 
without a Miranda violation. 
Taken together, from Tucker to Dickerson, the Chief participated in a 
total of fifty-seven major Miranda-related cases. 140 Arguably in all of 
because it shows the impact on the speech); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that no 
exclusionary rule applies when, after Miranda warnings, an accused made incriminating statement after 
an illegal search of the horne); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (asserting that statements 
acquired in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the accused); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 
195 (1989) (concluding that a Miranda form which states that a lawyer would be appointed only "if and 
when" he goes to court does not violate Miranda); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 (1988) (per 
curiam) (deciding that ordinary traffic stops do not amount to custody requiring Miranda warnings); 
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (finding that Miranda warnings effectively waived counsel 
despite the fact the accused had already been indicted); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that even though the accused had invoked his rights, this was a 
separate investigation involving a separate crime so no Miranda violation occurred); Greer v. Miller, 
483 U.S. 756 (1987) (finding that a comment at trial on the defendant's right to silence was error, but it 
was harmless here since the Court made two curative instructions); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 
(1987) (holding that statements made by the accused to his wife in the presence of the police are not 
suppressible); Colorado v. Spring, 497 U.S. 564 (1987) (finding no Miranda violation if, after Miranda 
rights were read, the accused believed the interview involved one crime but really was designed for 
another); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (determining that after Miranda warning there 
was no violation if the accused refused a written statement but agreed to an oral one); Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (finding no Miranda violation when a mentally ill person waives his 
rights and holding that the state must prove a waiver of rights only by preponderance of evidence); 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no 
Sixth Amendment violation where the accused requested an attorney at an arraignment and later 
waived an attorney after administration of Miranda rights); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) 
(finding no Miranda violation when an accused waived his rights although he was unaware that an 
attorney already had been appointed for him); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring) (holding that a request for a lawyer does not imply guilt, so comments 
before the jury possibly could have been harmless). 
136 495 U.S. 14. 
137 496 U.S. 292. 
138 507 U.S. 680. 
139 512 U.S. 452. 
140 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Stansbury v. California, 
511 U.S. 318 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 700 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, SOl U.S. 797 
(1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, SOl U.S. 171 (1991); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) 
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these cases, the Chief either voted to distinguish or limit the scope of the 
1966 ruling. 141 In case after case, the Miranda doctrine found no friend in 
William Rehnquist. 
Yet, when it came to Dickerson, the trend abruptly ended. Admittedly, 
it is possible that despite nearly thirty years of behaving otherwise, Justice 
Rehnquist genuinely believed in Miranda's constitutionality. 
Alternatively, perhaps the truth is precisely as the Chief described it in his 
opmlOn. Specifically, stare decisis is such an important value that it 
induced his capitulation. Yet, because in Dickerson the Chief could no 
longer count upon his long-standing alliance with Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy,142 his true policy preferences cannot be derived from within the 
Dickerson decision. Simply put, regardless of the Chiefs vote in 
Dickerson, it appears the majority of the Court-including some of 
Miranda's critics-was going to support the centerpiece of the Warren 
Court's criminal procedure revolution. 143 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 603 (1990) (Rehnquist, c.J., concurring 
in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); 
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Duckworth v. 
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 (1988); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 
285 (1988); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,690 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Greer v. Miller, 
483 U.S. 756 (1987); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 
(1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412 (1986); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 296 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51,61,67 (1985) (White, 1. and Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1984) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 
(1983); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Fletcher v. Weir, 
455 U.S. 603 (1982); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
491-92 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 475 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring); California v. Prysock, 451 U.S. l301 (1981); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 293-
94 (1980) (Rehnquist, 1., dissenting); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980); Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707 
(1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 226 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. l310 (1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387, 435-36 (1977) (White, 1. and Blackmun, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 
(1977); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Gamer v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433 (1974). 
141 See supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text. 
142 Cruz, supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
143 [d. Those arguing that the Chief Justice's decision was the product of a sensitivity to public 
opinion, respect for the principle of stare decisis, or separation of powers might better apply those 
theories to explain the behavior of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in Dickerson. 
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As noted before, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, along with the Chief, 
had similar histories of voting to limit Miranda. 144 Had they voted with 
Justices Scalia and Thomas in the conference, the Chief Justice would only 
need to join them to make a five member majority. Given his grudging 
interpretation of the Miranda doctrine,145 it is difficult to believe that if 
given the opportunity to cast a deciding vote, he would have come to 
Miranda's rescue. However, by all indications, Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy were initially in the pro-Miranda majority.146 This reduced the 
Chiefs feasible set, leaving him with one remaining question: whether to 
vote with the majority and thereby secure for himself the assignment 
decision or allow that authority to be exercised by Justice Stevens. 
The Chief chose the former. His choice does not itself completely 
elucidate the true nature of the Chiefs policy preferences. Again, it is 
possible that, in his later years, the Chief moderated his views. 147 In order 
to evaluate this contingency, as well as to fully understand the nature of the 
strategic maneuver, a review of Justice Rehnquist's post-Dickerson 
behavior is warranted. 
E. Evaluating the Evidence: Chief Justice Rehnquist's Post-Dickerson 
Miranda Jurisprudence 
Between his decision in Dickerson and his death, the Rehnquist-Ied 
Court considered five major Miranda-related cases. 148 In each of these 
cases, the Chief resumed exactly where he left off prior to Dickerson. 
Consider Chavez v. Martinez,149 where Justice Rehnquist voted to prevent a 
§ 1983 claim against police officers, holding that until unwamed 
statements are used at trial, there is no violation. 150 This vote is curious 
144 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
145 For a description of Justice Rehnquist's Miranda-related voting record, see supra notes 120-131 
and accompanying text. 
146 Cruz, supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
147 See Rosen, supra notes 5, 18 and accompanying text. Contra Cruz, supra note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
148 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); Chavez 
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
149 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
150 Rehnquist explained: 
We have likewise established the Miranda exclusionary rule as a prophylactic 
measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-
Incrimination Clause-the admission into evidence in a criminal case of 
confessions obtained through coercive custodial questioning. Accordingly, 
Chavez's failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate 
Martinez's constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action. And 
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because it is inconsistent with the position he purported to announce in 
Dickerson. Specifically, Chavez implies that a failure to comply with 
Miranda is somehow different from other violations of the Constitution 
where § 1983 permits recovery. 151 
His behavior in Chavez was soon followed by the 2004 companion 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" cases, Missouri v. Seibert l52 and United States 
v. Patane. 153 In Seibert, although a combined majority of the Court 
condemned the intentional use of a two-stage interrogation process 
designed to frustrate Miranda, the Chief joined the dissenting justices. 154 
In Patane, Justice Rehnquist again joined an opinion which furthered the 
notion that a Miranda violation is different from and less important than 
violations of other portions of the Constitution,155 as evidenced by 
descriptions of non-Miranda constitutional rights as "core protection,,,156 
"core privilege,,,157 "actual right,,,158 "actual protections,,,159 and "actual 
violations,,,16o thus distinguishing Miranda issues from "true" 
the absence of a "criminal case" in which Martinez was compelled to be a 
"witness" against himself defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim. 
[d. at 772-73 (citations omitted). 
151 Apparently, for the Chief, a Miranda violation held a lower constitutional status than, for 
example, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It has long been held that an illegal search in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment can be authority for § 1983 action. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (finding 
that unreasonable search and seizure by police officers supports a claim under § 1983); Finsel v. 
Cruppenik, 326 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that unlawful searches, excessive use of force and 
false imprisonment are actionable under § 1983 where deputy could not reasonably believe he could 
kick in a motel door and forcibly enter a room simply to effectuate motel clerk's desire to have a 
patron's truck moved); Bolden v. Village of Monticello, 344 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
that because no reasonable officer could believe a no-knock warrant authorizing search of a location 
and all persons located inside without naming specific individuals authorized invasive strip and body 
cavity searches, a § 1983 claim may be pursued); Terrell v. Petrie, 763 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
(concluding that a search incident to a pretext arrest is unreasonable and violates Fourth Amendment, 
for which a claim under § 1983 is available). 
152 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
153 542 U.S. 630 (2004). For a discussion of Siebert, Patane, and Chavez, see Yale Kamisar, 
PostScript: Another Look at Patane and Siebert, the 2004 Miranda "Poisoned Fruit" Cases, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 97 (2004). 
154 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor relied heavily on the 
analysis in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), stating, "Elstad commands that if Siebert's first 
statement is shown to have been involuntary, the court must examine whether the taint dissipated 
through the passing of time or a change of circumstances." [d. at 628. 
155 542 U.S. at 633. 
156 [d. at 637. 
157 [d. at 638. 
158 [d. at 639. 
159 [d. 
160 [d. at 642. 
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constitutional doctrines. 161 Patane, much like its pre-Dickerson 
counterpart Elstad,162 operates to preclude the application of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda violations. 163 This differential 
treatment in Elstad was based upon the notion of Miranda's sub-
constitutionality. 164 Following Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in 
Dickerson declaring Miranda a constitutional rule, the notion of sub-
constitutionality no longer seemed sustainable. Yet, Justice Thomas's 
opinion in Patane follows this sub-constitutional approach anyway by 
using the "prophylactic" language-terminology associated with 
Miranda's sub-constitutionality-which does not appear anywhere in the 
Chief Justice's opinion in Dickerson. 165 
Despite his opmIOn in Dickerson supporting Miranda's 
constitutionality, Justice Rehnquist supported positions in Seibert, Patane, 
Chavez, and other cases that described a Miranda violation as somehow 
different from other constitutional violations. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
that difference operated to preclude the application of traditional 
constitutional remedies such as § 1983166 as well as the suppression 
mechanism available through the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 167 
Simply put, the Chiefs post-Dickerson behavior, taken together with his 
pre-Dickerson voting, makes it almost impossible to avoid the 
conclusion-despite what he seemed to say in Dickerson-that Chief 
161 This point is appropriately raised by Professor Kamisar: 
At no time in Dickerson did Chief Justice Rehnquist contrast the prophylactic 
rules of Miranda with the "actual Self-Incrimination Clause." Nor, in Dickerson, 
did he ever contrast Miranda violations with a "core" violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause itself. Indeed at no time in Dickerson did Rehnquist call 
the Miranda rules "prophylactic." However, in his Patane plurality opinion, 
Justice Thomas repeatedly characterized the Miranda rules as "prophylactic" and 
repeatedly refers to "the core protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination 
Clause," "the core privilege against self-incrimination" protected by prophylactic 
rules, "the actual right against compelled self-incrimination" and "actual 
violations" of the Due Process Clause or the Self -Incrimination Clause. 
Kamisar, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
162 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985). 
16) "Thus, unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or actual violations of the 
Due Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, 
nothing to deter. There is therefore no reason to apply the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine of 
Wong Sun." Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 124-26. 
164 470 U.S. at 305. 
165 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
166 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003). 
167 Patane, 542 U.S. at 642. 
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Justice William Rehnquist did not really believe that Miranda was a 
constitutionally based decision. 
F. Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States 
From these post-Dickerson cases, it is clear that the Chiefs 2000 
decision did not reflect a new found respect for Miranda. Instead, with the 
direct question of Miranda's constitutionality already decided by a 
majority of the Dickerson Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did the best he 
could given the reduced choices in his feasible set. 168 Rather than allow 
Justice Stevens the power of opinion assignment, he voted with the 
majority and assigned himself the opinion. 169 Given his decision to craft a 
majority opinion, the Chief needed a rationale sufficient to garner a court 
majority. Thus, he cited stare decisis and the Warren Court's own view of 
what it was doing as justification for his support of Miranda. 170 
With the apparent elevation of Miranda to a fully constitutional status, 
the exceptions that had been built upon Miranda's sub-constitutional 
foundation stood in peril. Justice Stevens, the alternative opinion assignor, 
had a long history of resisting the Miranda exceptions. 171 After spending 
nearly thirty years crafting limitations to Miranda, it is hard to believe the 
Chief would allow Justice Stevens the opportunity to undo his legacy. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist thus took control of the future of the doctrine and 
168 See Cruz, supra note 2, at 15 ("Although not what one would describe as the tightest of logical 
syllogisms, it was the best that could be gotten from the current members of the Court."). 
169 "Had the Chief voted with the dissenters, the majority opinion would have been assigned by the 
senior Justice in the majority, in this case Justice Stevens . . .. [I]n my judgment, the Chief acted 
decisively to avoid that consequence. He voted with the majority and assigned the opinion to himself." 
Id. at 14-15. 
170 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442·43 (2000). Cruz, a former Rehnquist clerk, 
implies that the stare decisis rationale is a subterfuge. In responding to questions regarding 
Dickerson's logical underpinning, Cruz responds, "Do not ask why, and please, never, ever, ever cite 
this opinion for any reason." Cruz, supra note 2, at 15. 
l7l A cursory review of the voting records demonstrates that most of the Miranda exceptions 
supported by Chief Justice Rehnquist were opposed by Justice Stevens. See, e.g., New York v. Harris, 
495 U.S. 14 (1990); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 
(1980); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). Additionally, in some cases with Miranda 
issues, Justice Stevens prevailed while Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. See, e.g., Thompson v. 
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 
U.S. 675 (1988); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51(1985); 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); United States v. Henry, 
447 U.S. 264 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Evidence of Justice Stevens' view 
is also prominently demonstrated in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), where the oral argument 
displayed an exchange between Justices Stevens and O'Connor regarding the constitutional 
underpinning of the Miranda decision. "I must confess that if it's not a constitutional violation, I don't 
know where this Court ever had the power to set aside any state conviction ... , It seems to me 
analytically it must be a constitutional violation or else we have no business in this area at all." 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, id. (No. 83-773). 
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crafted an opinion that both studiously avoided discussion of the continued 
viability of the Miranda exceptions and included language designed to aid 
in his final stand. Although dicta in Dickerson, he argued that Miranda's 
newly discovered constitutionality was premised on its current form, a 
form which included all of its exceptions. Specifically, he stated, "our 
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on 
legitimate law enforcement while re-affirming the decision's core 
ruling .... "\72 
This sentence later became a centerpiece of the Patane opinion. 173 
Justice Thomas, with the support of the Chief, argued that both this 
language as well as the Dickerson Court's reliance upon cases such as 
Tucker and Elstad "demonstrate [ d) the continuing validity of those 
decisions" following Dickerson. 174 Although dicta, Rehnquist's wording 
that "subsequent cases [had] reduced the impact on law enforcement" 
somehow passed without public objection, as Dickerson features the 
complete absence of any concurring opinion. Yet, it is this sentence which 
is the Trojan horse of the Dickerson decision. To be precise, the genius of 
the stare decisis rationale as applied by the Chief Justice in Dickerson is 
that he applied it to all aspects of the Miranda doctrine, exceptions 
included. 
Thus, once again, when the Chief Justice elected to join the majority 
and assigned the opinion to himself, he both denied Justice Stevens control 
over the matter and crafted the very language which would later be used to 
argue that all of the exceptions are part of his constitutional decision. 
Many of those exceptions, of course, are based upon the sub-constitutional 
treatment for this "constitutional" rule. 
172 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
173 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
174 [d. at 640. 
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